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A.  Introduction 
 
This Article starts from two premises.  The first is that power—particularly regulatory 
power—is increasingly exercised across and between jurisdictions, in particular as a result 
of the intertwining of economies via trade.  The well-being of those involved in the 
production and trade in goods and services is determined by rules made in multiple 
jurisdictions, not just their own.  Concern about the environmental and social impact of 
economic activity is a particular reason for jurisdictions to try and impose norms upon each 
other.  The second premise is that the essence of constitutionalism is constitutional values 
and principles rather than particular institutional forms.  Such forms are contingent and 
instrumental, in the service of the values and principles.
1
  Many of those constitutional 
values and principles are concerned with the exercise of power (e.g., accountability, due 
process, and non-oppression). 
 
The transnational exercise of power challenges national constitutions because the scope of 
national constitutions is limited to the jurisdiction and territory they govern, while the 
matters affecting the well-being of their population are not.  National constitutions thus 
find themselves unable to guarantee their own values even within their territory.  This is 
one of the recent critiques of national constitutional law and practice.
2
  One possible 
reaction is to seek a global constitutional framework, often under the label of global 
constitutionalism, in which a unitary and hierarchical structure exists beyond the state.  
However, this Article suggests that this is both unrealistic in practice and undesirable in 
principle, for such a mega-constitution would be too far removed from the people to allow 
responsiveness, democracy, or self-realization. 
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This Article therefore offers a different kind of global constitutionalism, one that preserves 
constitutional values on the global scale by means of dialogue between the authors of 
power and those subjected to it.  This notion is derived from the idea of constitutional 
pluralism, developed in EU legal studies, whose core idea is presented here as follows:  A 
plural order can be constitutional. 
 
The claim goes a little further.  Plural constitutionalism is not a second-best option, a 
concession to the limitations of transnational law.  On the contrary, it is the only kind of 
constitutionalism which deserves to be taken seriously at the transnational level.
3
  No 
single constitutional order can embody the range of values and principles which 
constitutionalism entails, extending from the local to the universal and including both the 
encompassing regulation of power and the self-expression of the people.  Respect for 
those values therefore requires that multiple autonomous legal orders exist, that none 
dominate the others (thus an absence of fully resolved hierarchy), and that they show 
respect for and recognition of each other.
4
  Constitutionalism at a global scale necessarily 
lies not in institutions or hierarchies, but in the relationship between legal orders and the 
subjects and authors of those orders.   
 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Parts B and C explain the idea of regulatory pluralism, 
particularly in the context of international trade.  The suggestion is that producers, traders, 
and consumers are effectively subject to regulation coming not just from the states where 
they are located, but also from the states with whom they are economically involved.  Part 
D then argues that this should be seen as raising a constitutional problem because it 
amounts to the exercise of power by jurisdictions over groups of people who have no say 
in the law-making of that jurisdiction—power without accountability or representation.  
Parts E and F consider ways of thinking about this situation and different possible 
normative frameworks.  The ideas of extraterritoriality and of global governance are briefly 
explored but dismissed as unsatisfactory.  The first is a label rather than an explanatory 
concept, and the second is neither attractive nor realistic as a solution.  Part G then moves 
to constitutional pluralism and explains the arguments of scholars who have sought to 
reconcile constitutionalism and a plurality of legal orders.  It is argued here that 
constitutional pluralism is particularly plausible and attractive in the global concept, where 
other paths to constitutionality are absent.  It offers an explanation of how a global 
network of overlapping jurisdictions, lacking a unique hierarchy, could, under certain 
conditions of accommodation and dialogue, nevertheless be described as a constitutional 
order in a meaningful sense.  Part H then suggests that this is what global constitutionalism 
could, and indeed should, be understood to mean:  The preservation of constitutional 
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2012]                                                     1205 International Trade and Global Constitutionalism
values within the inevitably and desirably competing and interacting orders of the global 
legal spaghetti soup. 
 
B.  International Trade and Market Access Conditionality:  Regulatory Pluralism 
 
States often require that goods sold within their jurisdiction comply with certain standards 
concerning quality or safety.  They sometimes, and increasingly so, also require that the 
production of those goods complies with certain norms concerning the environment, 
sustainability, and human or labor rights.
5
  Enforcement of the product standards is 
typically domestic, but controls on production standards are often carried out in the state 
of production by private agencies, whose certifications may then be relied upon by 
national laws.
6
  Possession of such certification may be a condition for market access, for 
tax breaks, or for government purchase. 
 
In a formal sense, each producer may choose whether it is worth his while to comply with 
the regulations of a given state and, if not, may choose not to export to that state.  In 
competitive markets, however, that choice may be largely illusory.  A decision not to 
comply, and therefore to abandon a market, will result in loss of sales and market share, 
with economic and human consequences for the producer, shareholders, employees, and 
members of the community of which the producer is a part.  The company may fail, it may 
be taken over, or at the very least there may be a decrease in the economic welfare of 
those involved.  This is ever more the case as modern production often requires significant 
investment (i.e., sunk costs), reducing the flexibility of a company and its capacity to adapt 
to decreases in sales.   
 
Individual producers are also subject to the laws in force in the state where they are 
located.  A failure to comply with these could, in theory, have more serious consequences 
than a failure to comply with foreign regulations.  Unlike foreign governments, the 
domestic government has criminal sanctions within its enforcement repertoire.  Typically, 
the results of ignoring domestic or foreign product or production rules will be of a similar 
type:  There will be immediate financial repercussions—a fine or loss of sales—and the 
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Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59 (2002); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction:  An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249 (2000); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for 
Processes:  The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004); 
Gabrielle Marceau & Joel Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  A Map of the World Trade Organization 
Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2002). 
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company might ultimately be forced out of business.  Indeed, it will not necessarily be the 
case that a failure to comply with domestic rules has more serious consequences than a 
failure to comply with foreign ones.  Domestic enforcement measures may well pale 
beside the possibility of denied access to a major market, and a visit from a domestic 
inspector may be less feared than a visit from a private certification agency. 
 
This is not to deny the formal difference between domestic and foreign regulations.  The 
former have compulsory application, while the latter are merely a condition of market 
access.  Their de facto impact, however, is similar, and, from the perspectives of individual 
well-being and freedom, justice, and social and economic consequences, the formal 
distinction is of little importance. 
 
One may describe the situation applying to the individual producer as one of regulatory 
pluralism.  The laws which constrain the individual producer’s behavior originate from a 
number of different sources and jurisdictions.
7
  Put another way, within a given territory, 
multiple sets of regulations exercise power over, and impose de facto sanctions upon, 
producers located there. 
 
There is also a form of regulatory pluralism applying on the consumer market.  Where 
product markets are global, the rules of a large state may in fact determine the nature of 
the products sold on other markets, as producers seek to produce a single standardized 
product.  For example, the United States has wider and stricter rules concerning usability 
of computer equipment by disabled people than do most other jurisdictions.  Because 
computers are globally traded, the result is that these rules have become the de facto 
standard for other markets, including the EU.
8
  Various aspects of the computer equipment 
available to EU consumers are, in fact, determined by the rules in force in the United 
States, and it is practically impossible to buy computers not complying with these 
American rules.  Of course, computers on sale in the EU must also comply with EU and 
local national regulations.  The EU consumer market for computer equipment is thus 
characterized by regulatory pluralism. 
 
Precisely analogous situations can occur in services markets, with the EU application of its 
Emissions Trading Scheme to air transport being the most notable example.
9
  Access to EU 
                                            
7 The phrase is also used where some or most of the regulators are private.  See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Private 
Regulation in European Private Law, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 91 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2010). 
8 See, e.g., Lisa Waddington, The Internal Market and Disability Accessibility:  Using EC Law to Establish an Internal 
Market in Disability Accessible Goods and Services 7 (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Papers, No. 3, 2008). 
9 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 
E.C.R. I-000.  See also Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence & Gareth Davies, Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives 
on Extraterritorial Process Regulation, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 14 (2012) (specifically discussing the extraterritorial 
aspects of the case).  See the other papers in this special edition for discussion of its wider implications. 
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airports has been made conditional upon emissions-related payment, even where those 
emissions occurred outside EU airspace.  Access to the EU market is linked to aspects of 
the “production” of the service outside the EU.  This may be the beginning of a wider 
trend, and more service regulation may take account of the environmental or social 
consequences of actions of the service provider outside of the regulating jurisdiction.  In 
this Article, however, the emphasis will be on goods and their production, if only for ease 
of explanation. 
 
C.  The Causes of Regulatory Pluralism 
 
Regulatory pluralism has been defined above in terms of factual power, rather than formal 
jurisdiction.  As such, it is a question of degree.  Regulatory pluralism has increased in 
breadth and intensity over recent decades as global trade has increased.  This has made 
export markets more important and has intensified competition, so that the loss of 
markets and of competitive position is a greater threat to company survival than in a less 
global era.  The need to comply with foreign laws is proportionate to the gains and losses 
associated with success or failure on those states’ domestic markets.
10
  While global trade 
is a necessary background condition for regulatory pluralism, it is the spread of process 
and production regulation which the direct cause of such pluralism. 
 
Although there are examples of product standards which go back centuries, it was the 
second half of the twentieth century which saw product regulation become ubiquitous and 
one of the important activities of the state.  The spread of manufactured consumer goods 
had begun earlier, but took off in the post-war years, which saw a huge increase in 
material wealth among ordinary citizens, most notably in the United States but also, after a 
few years delay, in Europe.  These goods—complex, expensive, vulnerable to invisible 
defects, increasingly indispensable to daily life—cried out for regulation both on grounds 
of safety and quality.  The state had increased dramatically in size in the Second World War 
and was never again to shrink to its prewar dimensions.  For the first time, the state began 
to assume the role of a systematic regulator of society.  Product regulation can be seen 
alongside the welfare state as an aspect of the “risk society” in which law aimed not just to 
define moral limits, but to protect individuals from things going horribly wrong.
11
  In the 
U.S. and EU, it is now the case that almost any product—whether an appliance, a 
foodstuff, clothing, or even a raw material—will be subject to regulations concerning its 
safety and often its fitness for use or quality. 
 
Regulatory pluralism has reached a new level of intensity in recent years with the rise of 
production regulation through national legal measures addressing process and production 
                                            
10 ERICH VRANES, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:  FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, WTO LAW, AND LEGAL THEORY 
166 (2009). 
11
 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY:  TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 19–24 (1992). 
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methods (PPMs).
12
  These are rules which regulate not the physical composition of the 
product, but rather the way that it is made.  They usually address aspects of environmental 
protection and sustainability, or human rights and labor rights.  For example, access to a 
market may be refused if goods have been made by child labor, if the rights of the 
production workers are not respected, or if production occurs in a way which is particularly 
harmful to the environment.  In extreme cases, a total ban on sale may result from non-
compliance, but in other cases PPM requirements are used as conditions for eligibility for 
government purchase.  A state may, for example, decide only to purchase sustainably 
forested wood or “fair trade” coffee.
13
 
 
The controversial aspect of these rules is that they seem to be an attempt to interfere in 
another state’s domestic affairs.  While it is obvious that states have a legitimate interest 
in protecting their own consumers and enforcing product standards, the legitimate interest 
of State A in ensuring that workers, plants and animals in State B are treated according to 
the norms of A, even when B does not require this, entails a more complex argument.   
 
PPMs have, however, proliferated in parallel with the increasing globalization of markets 
and the increasing proportion of goods on sale in the United States and EU which come 
from developing countries.
14
  On the one hand, conscience dictates—to many—that rich 
countries should only import goods produced without exploitation or destruction.  On the 
other hand, local production methods can increasingly be linked to global concerns—and 
to the interests of the importing country—as a result of global warming and the global loss 
of species and habitats.  Making market access conditional upon production norms may be 
about pragmatic self-interest as much as it is about responsibility. 
 
D.  The Constitutional Gap:  Underrepresentation of Out-of-State Interests 
 
Regulatory pluralism creates a situation where power is exerted without accountability:  
Individuals have no voice in foreign jurisdictions whose rules nevertheless determine their 
welfare.  Producers are subjected to conditions imposed by the importing states, without 
representation in the politics of those states. 
 
This raises questions of economic efficiency.  Where those bearing the costs of rules are 
not represented in the process of their formation, a temptation is created to under-
estimate those costs, even to trivialize them.
15
  The regulating authority must only satisfy 
                                            
12 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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those constituents within its jurisdiction, meaning that the moral aesthetic of the voting 
public is likely to be more determinative of the form of law than cost-benefit analysis in the 
state of production.  Thus, a situation is created which invites the imposition of 
externalities, the formation of symbolic—rather than effective—legislation, and the 
glossing of inconvenient facts and costs borne elsewhere. 
 
Regulatory pluralism should be expected to create political tensions, too.  It is a situation 
akin to a benign but incompetent dictatorship:  The foreign legislator is a political authority 
which exercises de facto power but does not see itself as obliged to listen, show 
accountability, or respond to concerns directly.  Instead, the foreign legislator makes an 
appeal to an abstract and other-determined version of “your own best interests” and uses 
this to justify its interventions.  Resentment of the foreign power will often be a reasonable 
response. 
 
More importantly for this Article, regulatory pluralism raises constitutional questions.  The 
constitutionality of a legal order encompasses issues like those above, revolving around 
accountability, responsiveness, and the representation of interests.  Most national legal 
orders have a framework regulating these issues, guaranteeing an accountable political 
process and individual rights of appeal where interests are infringed without due process. 
 
Yet where individuals are subject to a legal order of which they are not a constitutional 
subject, this constitutional position is threatened.  Their own legal order cannot offer them 
protection, for the promises, sanctions and pressures of foreign law are outside of the 
domestic legislator’s scope.  At most, the domestic government could forbid interactions:  
It could prevent trade.  This would, however, be punishment in the name of protection, 
and while it might remove individuals from the reach of foreign regulation, that fact would 
be little comfort for them.  And yet there would be a certain logic to this approach.  By 
exposing them to trade, the state exposes domestic producers to power without 
responsiveness, the very situation which the national constitution—and arguably the state 
itself—exists to prevent. 
 
What is captured here is a problem of modern constitutionalism.  If constitutions, and 
constitutional expectations, are confined to the protection of basic human rights, then, 
because of the largely physical character of interactions which may violate these basic 
human rights, a state with a territory is able to guarantee them to its people.  If the power 
which is regulated is no more than the monopoly of violence, then the marriage of state, 
territory and constitution is coherent.  If, however, a life can be destroyed by poverty as 
well as by imprisonment, then a view of constitutionality in which human life and dignity 
are central will expect it to go further, providing not just a framework for the control of 
violence, but a framework for the management of welfare, distribution, and justice.  
Modern constitutions, and constitutional thinking, extend to the policing of public (and 
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private) power generally, including administrative decisions, the representation of 
interests, solidarity, distribution of resources, and other aspects of a “just” society.
16
  The 
broader scope of this second constitutional approach imposes far more intense and 
structural constraints on societal and governmental arrangements than a minimalist 
human rights guarantee would do.  Most importantly, it creates an image of the 
constitutional—of the just—which cannot be extrapolated to the wider world.  While 
foreign governments can be prevented from directly impeding speech or religious freedom 
within the territory, so long as there is trade they cannot be prevented from impacting 
social and economic justice.  Thus the more completely we order our values domestically, 
the less acceptable we implicitly find it to expose individuals to the arbitrary foreign power 
inherent in trade.  It is not other jurisdictions as such which challenge our constitutional 
values, but rather the overlaps between jurisdictions, the legal and personal spaces where 
multiple sets of rules apply, but none has the power to govern constitutionally. 
 
E.  Extraterritoriality:  Who Should Regulate What? 
 
The fact that this picture of a fragmented and incomplete constitutionality has become the 
global norm makes it worthy of analysis.  The most obvious response is to seek a proper 
allocation of interests or subjects of regulation:  You regulate this and those, and we will 
regulate that and them.  That such an allocation exists, or could exist, is often assumed.  
When a trade measure is accused of being “extraterritorial,” the implicit claim is that a line 
can be drawn between the proper subjects of regulators in different states, and that this 
line has been crossed.
17
 
 
The conceptual basis for such a line is usually found in the difference between product 
regulation and production regulation.
18
  The former, by addressing the nature of the 
product which is imported to the regulating state, is easily understood to be preventing 
harm in that state.  This is generally uncontroversial.  By contrast, where market access is 
made conditional upon compliance with environmental or social norms in the production 
process, the harm in question and the immediate subjects of the regulation are both 
located in the producing state.  This is easily seen as an attempt to regulate matters that 
are properly regulated by the authorities of the producing state (i.e., an extraterritorial 
                                            
16 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2005). 
17 See Ankersmit et al., supra note 9; Bartels, supra note 5; Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism’, Values, and 
International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 293 (2000). 
18 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment:  The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 291 (1997).  See also PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD:  AMERICA AND THE MAKING 
AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES 95–116 (2005); Bernhard Jansen, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European 
Perspective, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2000); John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the 
Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303, 306–307 (2000). 
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interference in another state’s business).  The assumption is that a regulator should 
address matters occurring only in its own physical territory.  Exceptions are sometimes 
made for matters considered to be offensive to all humanity—gross human rights 
violations or child labor, for example—but at least one initially plausible viewpoint is that 
here the line should be drawn.
19
 
 
This viewpoint becomes more problematic the more it is examined.  Its initial appeal lies in 
the perception that each community should rightfully look after its own interests, but not 
those of others.  Legitimate self-interest and self-protection is implicitly contrasted with 
interference and busy-bodying.  The problem with this is that the interests of a state and 
its population are not limited by territory.  Most practically, for example, some local events 
have global consequences, such as the emission of carbon dioxide.  But it is also quite 
plausible to claim that as human beings, inhabitants of a planet, we have an interest in 
preserving species, habitats, and the environment as a whole, even outside of the borders 
of our own state.  Consider the contrary:  Is it plausible to suggest that an individual has no 
interest in what happens to the planet outside those borders? 
 
More seriously, the idea that interests always have a unique “owner” is logically 
incoherent.
20
  Interests can only be rationally understood in terms of the conditions 
necessary for well-being, but well-being is a subjective state of affairs.  Hence the interests 
of a population are necessarily in those things which they subjectively care about.  The 
protection of public health, for example, is one of the less controversial reasons for state 
action:  Who would deny that a state may—or should—act to protect the health of its 
population?  Yet it only does so because the population cares about its health.  It is the 
subjective concern which makes the interest real.  Since people can, and do, care about 
what happens to other human beings, the interests of others are part of our own interests.  
The well-being of people in various jurisdictions is necessarily intertwined by the fact of 
our human concern or compassion for each other.  When market access is made 
conditional upon social norms, the population of the regulating state is being protected 
from implication in acts which offend their basic values.
21
  That population is also taking 
steps, via their laws, to change a situation which they experience as unpleasant.  They are 
acting in their own interests, as well as those of others.  Indeed, given that there is always 
the serious risk that process measures are ineffective and do not achieve their goals, such 
                                            
19 See Bartels, supra note 5; Sands, supra note 17, at 300. 
20 See Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 70; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9. 
21 See Gareth Davies, Morality Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty, 6 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 249 (2007). See also Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 (1998); 
Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law:  Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the 
Undermining Mole, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 43, 69 (2008). 
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measures may be understood as primarily being about the interests of the regulating 
population:  Whether or not the measures make life better for workers, they supply a 
moral comfort which adds to the quality of life in a way quite comparable to good health 
or public order.  How does it feel to hold, see, or taste a product which has been made by 
exploited or mistreated workers, by destruction of ancient habitats, or at the cost of 
animal welfare?  For some, that feeling is worth legislating to avoid.  In wealthy countries, 
the some may become the many and even the majority. 
 
The idea that interests can be separated does not therefore find a basis in an analysis of 
who is and should be concerned by what.  Rather, any basis that it may have comes from 
the superposition of a new factor, with its own moral status:  Sovereignty.  Sovereignty 
invites the claim that, while all humans may be concerned about each other, and about the 
world as a whole, they should in some situations restrain that concern in order to respect 
the right and capacity of each community to determine its own living conditions.   
 
This is, however, an assertion of the importance of respect for jurisdictional limits rather 
than an explanation.  At its baldest it is no more than a sovereignty fetish, often rooted in 
historical traditions of a strong respect for this idea.
22
  Prima facie it opposes sovereignty 
to humanity,
23
 and it can only escape this unhappy tension if it can be shown that the 
assertion of sovereignty against out-of-state production measures is itself necessary to 
protect important human values, i.e., that the consequences of well-meant interference 
are not in fact good.  That debate is worth having.  There may well be good policy 
arguments for seeking to limit the extent and impact of regulation related to out-of-state 
production methods, but it is far from self-evident that a hard or clear line would emerge 
as an optimal approach.
24
  Not only are states and interests factually intertwined in the 
world, but the trend of recent decades has been to question traditional approaches to 
sovereignty in this light, and even to emphasize the responsibility of states to those outside 
their borders.
25
  The mood of the age is to dilute or nuance some of the more rigid 
historical dogmas of international law in the name of global well-being. 
 
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that legal systems, until now, have shown no 
inclination to allocate interests.  Where the legality of process and production measures 
has been adjudicated before the WTO or the European Court of Justice, there has been 
only a marginal test of the nature of the interest concerned, and a readiness to accept that 
                                            
22 John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms:  Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67 
(2001). 
23 Andreas Follesdal, Global Distributive Justice?  State Boundaries as a Normative Problem, 1 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 261, 270–71 (2012). 
24 Jackson, supra note 18, at 306–07. 
25
 C.f. NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 107 (1999). 
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concern for plants, animals and persons in other jurisdictions is legitimate.
26
  Legality has 
turned instead on questions of procedure and proportionality:  Were parties consulted, 
and were the measures really necessary and effective?
27
  These are to a large extent 
proxies for genuineness.  The question these courts were asking themselves is whether the 
process and production measures in question were really aimed at protecting the 
environment, or whether they were an attempt to keep out inconvenient competition. 
 
In fact, there is a remarkable consensus within legal discussion that interests are 
intertwined and that each party should take each other’s interests into account.  A party 
regulating out-of-state production processes makes this explicit, but a party objecting 
within the context of the EU or WTO is really making the same claim:  They are asking the 
WTO or EU to restrain the regulation of the other state.  A sovereignty-oriented view 
would concede to states a maximum freedom in determining their own interests and the 
terms of access to their own markets.
28
  By contrast, where an extraterritoriality objection 
is raised within an international legal system, the claim is that such sovereign freedom 
should be, and is, limited (i.e., that states should not be able to determine their interests 
without taking into account the interests of others).  The disagreement between the 
regulating and producing state is not really about the extent of sovereignty, but about 
whether they are listening to each other enough.  Dialogue and mutual concern, all parties 
agree, is beyond question. 
 
F.  The Global Governance “Solution” 
 
If regulatory pluralism cannot be avoided by an allocation of interests, then an alternative 
response is to look for constitutionality in a global legal architecture above and beyond 
national law.
29
  Agreement on substantive norms and procedures, embodied in treaties, 
institutions and adjudicatory processes, could entrench a global consensus on the 
minimum norms necessary for morally acceptable trade or on the minimum standards for 
the treatment of people and the planet generally. 
 
Such global harmonization would preempt regulatory pluralism, at least if it was 
understood to preclude further out-of-state process and production regulation within the 
relevant field.  That would re-establish a classical constitutional order, in which rules were 
imposed by an accountable and democratic rule-maker—insofar as treaties and 
international institutions are accountable and democratic—on a scale matching the 
                                            
26 Davies, supra note 5; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9. 
27 Scott, supra note 15; MADURO, supra note 15, at 173. 
28 Howse & Regan, supra note 5, at 275–76; JASON POTTS, THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER THE GATT 35–36 (2008), 
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms_gatt.pdf. 
29 See Follesdal, supra note 23, at 265–68. 
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breadth of human activity, removing the disjunction between constitutional orders and 
regulatory power. 
 
Many steps in this direction exist.  There are treaties on the protection of the environment, 
and against child labor.  The International Labour Organization is a global organization 
concerned with labor standards.  The EU harmonizes the laws and regulations of its 
member states, partly to avoid the kind of problems discussed here.  The WTO does not 
legislate and cannot itself create new norms, but its adjudicators can nurture, encourage, 
or obstruct the development of global standards by the way they approach national 
regulations derogating from free trade.  Paradoxically, it could well be that by being hostile 
to unilateral process measures they do more to encourage the development of multilateral 
standards—which then become the only realistic approach—than if they continue their 
current tolerant and procedural assessment of national PPMs.
30
  The relationship between 
WTO adjudication and global labor and environmental standards is a complicated one, but 
there is every reason to think that a non-trivial influence exists. 
 
Yet the suggestion that working towards a more developed global legal order is an 
adequate response to regulatory pluralism is both unrealistic and, in principle, undesirable.  
It is unrealistic to think that a sufficient consensus can be reached on global environmental 
and social concerns:  Agreements will tend to be a lowest common denominator, leaving 
many states frustrated and wanting to go further.  Regulatory interference is thus not 
removed from the table, but merely confined.  Agreements are less of an alternative for 
regulatory pluralism than a container for it.  Moreover, if there was a substantive 
consensus on the norms in issue, then regulatory pluralism would probably not be an issue 
anyway, since national standards and practices would be less offensive to trading partners. 
 
In any case, one of the most important motors of regulatory pluralism is the existence of 
the failed state, which is unable to live up to its own ambitions or those of its people and is 
unable to enforce laws or rights or enact them in an effective way.  Global legal 
arrangements will not solve this.  By contrast, importing states which adopt production 
measures, by exerting pressure directly on producers and traders, may be able to speak on 
behalf of interests and people which are effectively unrepresented by their own state.
31
  
The enforcing power of trade conditionality may be greater than that of the local police. 
 
Aside from these practical considerations, international measures face too great a 
legitimacy problem to be a major part of a solution for a constitutional deficit.  The 
                                            
30 See Gareth Davies, Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization?  Lessons in Tolerance and Trade 
from the European Union for the WTO and other RTAs, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 
265, 274 (Federico Ortino & Lorand Bartels eds., 2006); Sands, supra note 17, at 302. 
31 Such conditionality may also come from multinational corporations acting out of a sense of corporate social 
responsibility. 
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democratic control over international organizations and law is indirect, as is their 
accountability, and this prevents them achieving the depth of legitimacy required to justify 
legal colonization of the socially sensitive, complex, and context-specific fields involved in 
regulatory pluralism.  Environmental and social norms may be expressions of universal 
values at some minimum level, but at any other they are expressions of intense and 
varying local preferences.  Regulatory pluralism is not about enforcing a pre-agreed 
universal value set, but an attempt at propagating a specific set of values and choices 
elsewhere. 
 
While this colonial aspect is what makes it so controversial, it is also what makes it 
important.  Regulatory pluralism is an expression of the mutual involvement of 
communities with each other, and it is also something that is far more flexible, adaptable, 
and potentially expressive than a single global regime.
32
  This matters because the issues 
involved are dynamic ones, where costs and benefits are complex and changing.  They 
require a more sophisticated and targeted approach than framework agreements at the 
level of well-meaning banality.  Different products, different trade flows, and different 
countries may raise different problems and need different solutions.  Sustainable forestry, 
sustainable fishing, labor conditions in the footwear and clothing industries, bio-fuels, 
farming and diversity, animal welfare:  These are the kinds of matters that can be the 
subject of process-based regulation, but the situation in one state is not that in another.
33
  
The reasons for intervention also vary, from the philosophical and political to the 
economic.  On the side of the producing state, choices always have much to do with 
development and (relative) wealth.  On the side of the (usually richer) importing states, 
concerns about the environment and social conditions are tied up with concerns about 
competition.  Sometimes there is a dominant perception that it is unfair to permit foreign 
competitors to conquer domestic markets when they rely on practices which are morally 
offensive to the domestic majority and not open to domestic economic actors.  Sometimes 
it is the more nuanced realization that domestic process regulation is only sustainable in 
practice if it is applied to imports too; otherwise, producers will migrate or domestic 
industry will be eliminated.  A concern about competition can be a necessary part of a 
concern about another issue. 
 
Most of these concerns are tied somehow, more or less directly, to the cost of production, 
and it is the cheapness of bad social and environmental practices which makes them 
attractive.  Costs of production, however, are also fast-changing, and important drivers of 
competitive and comparative advantages can melt away under the wider influence of 
                                            
32 See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 329 (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and 
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 794–95 (1994); Jenia I. Turner, The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal 
Law, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 579–82 (2012). 
33 For more examples, see Ankersmit et al., supra note 9. 
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increasing prosperity and decreasing wealth differences between states.  If states are to 
respond to concerns about production methods elsewhere, then these responses will have 
to be revisited constantly, and states will require freedom of regulatory action.  The risk of 
entrenching, and thereby freezing, rules, and even substantive norms, should be avoided. 
 
The fluidity that is an inherent part of a desirable policy response to the fact of problems 
associated with trade and production provides another reason not to look to international 
treaties or organizations for an answer.  It is hard enough for states to react at the pace of 
global economic development.  An international legal architecture certainly cannot. 
 
Such an architecture has the additional weakness that it is inherently centralized.  
Centralization is most likely to be acceptable and effective where there is consensus on the 
goals and methods of the law, creating a space suitable for technocrats, so that 
“objectively,” or at least inter-subjectively, appropriate rules can be made, as is sometimes 
claimed to be the case for competition law, for example.
34
  By contrast, the situation being 
examined in this Article involves variable and varying values and a need for trial and error.  
For it is manifestly the case that whether market access conditionality will lead to a better 
world is a difficult and empirical question, and the answer is almost certainly “in some 
cases it may, in others it will not.”  A fair trade scheme in one place may lead to farmers 
and their families enjoying better lives, while in another it may hinder development or 
consolidation which would ultimately benefit the communities involved.  Economists, 
development experts, and political scientists debate and disagree, and it seems almost 
beyond controversy to suggest that perceptions will continue to develop as process 
measures are tried out and fail or succeed.  The need, from a policy perspective, is not to 
eliminate state responses to each other’s social and environmental conditions, but rather 
to bring constitutionality to those responses:  To treasure the freedom to exercise 
regulatory power in the name of out-of-state interests, but imbue that freedom with 
constitutional values. 
 
                                            
34 See, e.g., GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE (1996); Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic 
Deficit’:  The Question of Standards, 4 EUR. L. J. 5 (1998).  
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G.  Constitutional Pluralism 
 
Constitutional pluralism is an idea emerging from recent legal scholarship on the EU.
35
  Its 
philosophical background is in critiques of national constitutionalism, but the immediate 
cause of the idea’s prominence and its practical relevance is the standoff between the 
European Court of Justice and various national supreme courts, notably the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, on the question of ultimate authority.
36
  The roots of that 
conflict lie in the ECJ’s assertion of the supremacy of EU law over national law, even over 
national constitutions.
37
  While everyday supremacy is largely uncontroversial now, the 
supremacy of the treaties over national constitutions has been rejected quite explicitly by 
several national supreme courts, which have reaffirmed that EU law takes effect in their 
jurisdiction subject to their constitution.
38
  There is no sign of this situation changing to any 
significant extent. 
 
It is tempting to see this in terms of conflict, with the important question being “who is the 
ultimate boss?” or “who has the last word?”
39
  These are questions about law in practice, 
but the story to which they are relevant is the story of European integration, and the 
interpretation of the various judgments from that perspective gives a story of a claim, of 
rejection, and now of a long period of more-or-less uncomfortable standoff.  Possible 
endings which scholars may imagine, advocate, or fear include “surrender,” “defeat,” or 
“cold war.”  Surrender would describe the situation where national courts finally concede 
the subordination of their constitutions to EU law, resulting in the formation of a coherent 
and accepted European constitutional order in the classical hierarchical mold, i.e., a fully 
constituted EU.  Defeat would entail the assertion of national court sovereignty in a real 
and substantive way, so that the claims of the ECJ were exposed as failures.  This would 
amount to the containment of EU law within national legal orders and the limitation of the 
                                            
35 See, e.g., MACCORMICK, supra note 25; Miguel P. Maduro, Contrapunctual Law:  Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism 
in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 501 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of 
Constitutional Conflict:  Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11 EUR. L.J. 
262 (2005); Walker, supra note 2; Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 RATIO JURIS 365, 377–78 (2010); 
Joseph Weiler, Prologue:  Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism:  Some Doubts, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 8 (2011). 
36 Julio B. Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 EUR. L.J. 389 (2008). 
37 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1125. 
38 PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 268-97 (5th ed., 2011).  See also Jan Komarek, Playing with Matches:  
The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution, VERFASSUNGBLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/playing-matches-czech-constitutional-courts-ultra-vires-
revolution/#.UJ6QZYfAcpZ (discussing the recent decision of the Czech Constitutional Court). 
39 Mattias Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?:  Three Conceptions of the Relationship 
Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 
351, 351–52 (1999); Kumm, supra note 35. 
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EU to an organization for intergovernmental co-operation, however multifaceted and 
complex that co-operation might be.  A traditional constitutional order would once again 
be reasserted, but this time at the national level.  The third ending, “cold war,” means that 
neither side in fact accepts the claim to supremacy of the other, but neither translates 
their standpoint into concrete conflict.
40
  Thus it remains a theoretical disagreement, 
smothered by consensus in practice.  That has in fact been largely the situation for several 
decades and appears to be relatively stable.
41
  Agreement on substantive questions of law 
has rendered disagreement on the question of who has the last word academic, and the 
loyalties of lower judges have not been tested.  National courts have gone to the brink a 
few times, but their revolts have ultimately been of a relatively minor nature and 
containable.
42
  Remarkably, the whole saga of the Constitutional Treaty, its rejection, and 
the reformation of the EU legal order within the Treaty of Lisbon have passed this story by, 
neither advancing nor undermining the claims of any of the courts involved, and leaving 
the question of ultimate authority as open as before. 
 
The perspectives described above are perspectives on Europe, but an increasing group of 
scholars have begun to look at the standoff from a more constitutional perspective.  Rather 
than taking sides on the Europe versus the Member States question, they look for 
constitutionality, or its absence, in the current situation.  One of the driving forces of this 
investigation is the widespread realization that none of the endings offered above is 
satisfactory.
43
  Surrender hands over too much power to a centralized and detached EU, 
and sidelines the history, rootedness, demoi and legitimacy of the Member States and their 
constitutional orders.  Even the Europhile lawyer usually concedes that legal orders should 
be of and for the people, and accountable to them, and that the EU is not able to deliver 
on these fronts yet.  Moreover, the moment when it is may never arrive, for its scale and 
internal diversity may mean that could never offer the degree of ownership, 
responsiveness and self-realization that an autonomous local order can.
44
  Yet defeat for 
                                            
40 Joseph H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order—Through the Looking 
Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J 411, 445–446 (1996); Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal 
Order:  Isolated Incident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? 18-20 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084639. 
41 Dyevre, supra note 40, at 41. 
42 For further comments, see Komarek, supra note 38; Dyevre, supra note 40, at 20–27; Jan Komarek, European 
Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant:  Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony 6–17 (Jean Monnet 
Work Papers, No. 10/05, 2005). 
43 See Mattias Kumm, Constitutionalism and the Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism: Institutional Civil 
Disobedience and Conscientious Objection, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 163 (Julie Dickson 
& Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); Maduro, supra note 3. 
44 See the ongoing jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court on this point, especially 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 
BVERFGE 155; BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, 143 BVERFGE 2.  See also CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 
38, at 272–283. 
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the ECJ is hardly attractive either, for it would be a reassertion of an uncompromising 
national sovereignty.  The dominant view in most branches of European legal scholarship is 
still that this is dangerous and regressive:  The EU was born as a reaction to the inability of 
national legal orders to entrench and protect core human values.  It is an embodied 
perception that the constitutional order in its best and most substantive sense requires a 
context wider than the state if it is to be realized.  Closed national constitutional orders are 
weak, isolated, unable to guarantee the protections they preach, and ultimately unstable 
in a world where the winds of global economic and social change blow hard.
45
 
 
Yet while these first two endings are undesirable for pragmatic, realistic reasons regarding 
the societies in which the constitutions find themselves, the third ending seems to be the 
worst yet:  It is not constitutional at all.  Cold war describes a situation in which the answer 
to questions such as “what is the constitutional order here?” or “what are your rights?” or 
“who is the final court?” is “I’m not quite sure.”
46
  That lack of order seems at first glance 
to be the antithesis of constitutionality.   
 
Constitutional pluralism offers another way of looking at this ambiguous standoff situation, 
which casts it in a more constitutional light and in which it may be—under certain 
conditions—a more authentically constitutional order than any other alternative. 
 
The details of the idea can be presented in various ways.  Constitutional pluralists are a 
broad group, with a range of views.
47
  Critics of constitutional pluralism are perhaps even 
broader and may formulate the core idea in yet more ways.  One of two propositions, 
however, is at the heart of most presentations of the idea.
48
  Sometimes there is a focus on 
the observable fact that the EU contains a plurality of constitutional orders.  The EU and its 
treaties, because of their characteristics—autonomy, rights, democracy, the power to 
order society—may be argued to be constitutional in all but the most semantic sense 
without denying that the Member States each have their own constitutional order too.  
The claim here is then a descriptive one:  Multiple constitutional orders can and do co-exist 
within a single territory.   
 
                                            
45 Walker, supra note 2, at 320. 
46 Gareth Davies, Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for pluralism, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 269 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012); Eleftheriadis, supra note 35, at 
377–378. 
47 The collection of articles found in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Matej Avbelj & 
Jan Komarek eds. 2012) demonstrate this range of viewpoints.  See also Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek, Four Visions 
of Constitutional Pluralism (EUI Working Paper Law, No. 2008/21), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334219. 
48 Both claims are similar to the first two of Maduro’s three claims.  See Maduro, supra note 3. 
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Put like this, constitutional pluralism is of limited interest to lawyers.  It is more of a social-
empirical claim, rather like legal pluralism, which was initially an insight from 
anthropologists.
49
  It is also vulnerable to some very forceful criticisms of its accuracy.  On 
the one hand, is the EU really a constitutional order?  On the other hand, are Member 
State constitutions still deserving of their name?
50
 
 
An alternative formulation of constitutional pluralism is of more interest here.  This 
formulation can be summarized in the following statement:  A constitution can be plural, 
that is to say that a plurality of autonomous legal orders can together comprise an order 
which is constitutional.  This is not quite the way that constitutional pluralism is put 
forward by its leading proponents, and some would object to several of its implications:  It 
marginalizes certain classical aspects of constitutionality, notably institutional unity and 
final authority, in favor of a promotion of constitutional values.
51
  In a number of ways, 
however, the formulation is true to the spirit and core insights which the scholarship on 
constitutional pluralism contains.   
 
One idea which emerges from this work is that no single legal order can provide an 
adequate constitutionality in circumstances where other legal orders exert de facto power.  
It is then national legal constitutional traditions in their most traditional form, with their 
emphasis on the unitary and exclusive ordering of power, which are a betrayal of 
constitutionalism.
52
  Such orders cannot provide accountability, the policing of power, and 
the protection of the individual in a globalized world, or in the EU.
53
  Any single legal order 
is either too small for its function or too large to be responsive and rooted.  Closed 
constitutions deny self-realization to their people, either through weakness or through 
distance. 
 
                                            
49 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism:  Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 390–
91 (2008). 
50 Davies, supra note 46. 
51 See Walker, supra note 2, at 341 (regarding the institutional aspect of constitutionalism as necessary).  See also 
Nico Krisch, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law 40-42 (Law, Society, and Economy, Working Paper 
12/2009) (preferring not to call such a state of affairs constitutional); Matej Avbelj, Can European Integration be 
Constitutional and Pluralist—Both at the Same Time?, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
BEYOND 381 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).  But see Maduro, surpa note 3. Maduro is prepared to leave 
institutionalized hierarchy behind.  See also Wiener, supra note 1, at 2–3; Jan Komarek, Institutional Dimension of 
Constitutional Pluralism, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 231 (Matej Avbelj & Jan 
Komarek eds., 2012).  
52 See Maduro, supra note 3; Daniel Halberstam, Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional 
Law:  National, Supranational, and Global Governance 22–23 (University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 229, 2011). 
53 Walker, supra note 2, at 320. 
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Yet the core idea in normative constitutional pluralism—among those who advocate it 
rather than merely observing it—is that, while the various constitutions should interact, 
none should dominate the others.
54
  Constitutional pluralism is above all other things a 
doctrine of non-domination.  Each order speaks for certain legitimate groups and interests, 
but no order can speak for all.
55
  Constitutionality entails that interests are represented, 
that a balance is sought between them, and—most classically constitutional of all—that 
they are taken account of in the exercise of power.  In a plural situation, that requires 
constitutions to speak to each other.
56
 
 
Such communication is premised on some degree of mutual respect and on some degree 
of underlying shared values.
57
  It is in the discovery and expression of these that a plurality 
of orders comes to form a coherent constitutional whole.  That process is one of 
communication and dialogue, not just between courts, although this has been the 
overwhelming focus of European study, but in all ways relevant to law and power.  
Constitutions and legal orders are means of self-expression, and it is ultimately 
communities which, globally or within the EU, are engaged in recognizing each other and 
accommodating each other because of their factual interdependence and intertwining.   
 
Constitutional pluralism offers the view that the values of non-oppression, rights, and 
accountability can only be preserved in a plural system.  A plural system in which there is 
no communication, however, leaves the exercise of power ignored and un-policed.  It is the 
dialogue and respect between systems which makes pluralism potentially constitutional.
58
  
 
Constitutional pluralism in this sense is thus a goal or a possibility rather than a 
description.  The process will always be imperfect, and constitutionality has to be imagined 
as a question of degree.  It suggests how regulatory pluralism could be constitutional and 
offers a way of looking at the global situation whose attraction is that there appears to be 
no plausible alternative. 
 
                                            
54 The idea has also been referred to as constitutional tolerance.  See Joseph Weiler, Federalism Without 
Constitutionalism:  Europe’s Sonderweg, in THE FEDERAL VISION:  LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 54 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2002). 
55 Maduro, supra note 3. 
56 Joseph H. Weiler, In Defense of the Status Quo:  Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 7 (Joseph Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003);  Maduro, supra note 35. 
57 Kumm, supra note 35. 
58 Id.  See also Maduro, supra note 35. 
          [Vol. 13 No. 11 1222 G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l  
H.  Global Constitutionalism 
 
Does constitutional pluralism applied to regulatory pluralism give us global 
constitutionalism?  That latter phrase is increasingly used by scholars of international law 
seeking to describe the growing networks of international organizations and laws, but also 
by those concerned about the issues of legitimacy that these raise.
59
  Is there a global 
constitutional order?  Should there be?  Can there be?  While this scholarship has been 
open to new ways of thinking about constitutionality, it has nevertheless tended to focus 
on international law and institutions, on domestic constitutions, and on their relationship 
or the choices that need to be made between them.
60
  Only a few scholars have sought or 
found constitutionality in the reactions of different national orders to each other:  As an 
attitude and as a phenomenon of an unordered field, as it were.
61
  
 
Constitutional pluralism shows how this can be the case, that the constitutional can be 
found in values embedded in laws derived from multiple sources via communicative 
processes.  This is a better prospect for constitutionality on a global scale because it is 
something which is achievable, which can be realistically worked towards, and, above all, is 
something which corresponds to the values of constitutionalism rather than only a 
selection of its abstract forms.
62
  
 
That is not to say that global constitutionalism has arrived.  Instead, a picture of what it 
might look like begins to emerge, as do the kind of steps that need to be taken to go in that 
direction—above all, that lawmakers and courts take account of wider interests than those 
of their own constituents and listen to those in other jurisdictions.  To continue the process 
of constituting the international legal order, there is therefore a need for reflexivity and 
mutual learning.
63
  This is not just a horizontal process, but should also take place between 
the different organs of the legal order, including courts, lawmakers, and people.  As we see 
in the EU, judgments may lead to laws, laws may lead to change, and outrage may lead to 
treaties.  All the processes which support the exercise of regulatory power by jurisdictions 
on each other are involved in a “networked constitution” which emerges—or does not—
                                            
59 Wiener, supra note 1, at 12.  
60
 See RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. 
Trachtman eds., 2009); Wiener, supra note 1, at 7–11. See also Halberstam, supra note 52, at 4–5. 
61 Halberstam, supra note 52; Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism:  The 
Emergence of a Transnational Legal-Pluralist Order, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 16, 50 (2012). 
62 Halberstam, supra note 52, at 37. 
63 Walker, supra note 2, at 336. 
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from shared and discovered values.
64
  Reality may reveal this process to fail in many ways.  
It is, however, the only show in town. 
                                            
64 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality—The Viability of the Network Concept, 3 EUR. L.J. 
33 (1997). 
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